There must be a finding of substantial harm to a child by clear and convincing evidence before a court may restrict religious indoctrination by parents of different persuasions. A court need not wait for a formal psychiatric breakdown of a child to determine that the burden of proof in a finding of substantial harm has been met. [...]

The best interest of the child standard in resolving child custody disputes cannot include race as a factor without violating the due process prohibition against racial classifications in government regulation. The Court will always strike down a state activity under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause if it infringes the rights of racial group recognized as a constitutional suspect class by the Fifth Amendment unless the state can show that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate end of government. [...]

A change in residential custody must be determined under the endangerment standard. There is a presumption that a custodial parent’s choice to move children should generally be allowed. [...]

A court may award custody of a child to a parent if it is shown that that parent will attempt to destroy the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent. The most important consideration in any custody decision is the best interests of the child. [...]

It is not a clear abuse of discretion for a trial court to disregard expert testimony. The mother complains that it is not in the child’s best interests for his primary residence to alternate monthly between bilingual households. [...]

There is no rebuttable presumption in favor of the placement of children with the primary caregiver absent proof that the primary caregiver has harmed the children in any way. The Parenting Act of 1987 requires consideration of seven factors and provides that the child’s relationship with each parent be the factor given the greatest weight in determining the permanent residential placement. [...]