There are three different ways to become emancipated in the state of California. First, anyone who becomes married with the consent of their parents or guardian and permission from a family court can become emancipated. Second, a person can enlist in the United States military and serve in active duty. The third way is to obtain a declaration of emancipation from a judge through a court order.

The first two methods above are relatively self explanatory. In order for a minor to obtain a declaration of emancipation in the state of California there are five general requirements. First, under California state law, a person must be at least 14 years old. Second, the teenager must already be living apart from his or her parents or guardian with their consent. Third, the minor must earn enough money to pay all of his or her living expenses responsibly, and must make all the decisions about how that money is spent. Furthermore, and not surprisingly, the minor’s income must be legal. Earning a living through crime is not going to persuade the court to grant a declaration of emancipation.

The last requirement is that emancipation must be in the minor’s best interests. Anyone can come to court and argue that emancipation would be detrimental and the judge can deny the court order even if all of the other requirements are met.

For more information, please refer to this Emancipation Guide for the state of California.

General information on becoming an emancipated minor.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law related case involved the issue of interspousal immunity in the context of a suit for false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution.

FACTS: Mr. and Ms. Hill married in August 1972 and had a child in 1973. Ms. Hill had two children from a previous marriage. The parties separated in September 1978 and have had a contentious relationship concerning the custody of their minor child. W brought suit for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and abuse of process while dissolution proceedings were pending.

Her complaint alleged that from time to time during the separation she would leave the marital home with the three children. In an effort to have her return home, the husband, upon locating the family, would forcibly remove the parties’ child from the wife’s custody and would threaten to obtain a divorce and sell the marital home. The wife alleged that she believed she could not retain custody in the city of the marital home and therefore moved herself and the children to Tennessee to live in a religious commune.

The wife alleged that H and his lawyer illegally subpoenaed her bank records to locate her. The husband then flew to Tennessee to again take custody of the child. The wife returned to Florida and, with several friends, visited the child at the marital home, at which time the husband called the police and had her vacate the premises. H then sought to have her involuntarily committed for mental illness and succeeded in doing so for one day.

H defended his action with a claim that he had probable cause to have his wife committed. He asserted that his wife had previously experienced a mental breakdown requiring her confinement in a straitjacket; that she had been previously committed for mental incompetency for three and one-half months; that she belonged to a religious cult; and that she had destroyed a new television set claiming it was an instrument of the devil, after which she affixed a makeshift shrine which included a Bible, candles, and other paraphernalia having meaning only to her.

The husband claimed that he did not act maliciously, but only for the safety and welfare of the parties’ five-year-old daughter. The trial court granted summary judgment for the H and held that the claims against him were barred under the interspousal immunity doctrine. The district court affirmed but then certified the question of whether interspousal tort immunity should apply to intentional torts.

ISSUE: Is interspousal immunity a valid defense in Florida?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. Interspousal immunity is a valid defense in Florida.

HOLDING AND DECISION: Neither a wife nor a husband should be required to endure abuse from their spouse without a suitable means of retribution. On the other hand, a means of recovery within the traditional tort system can seriously affect the family unit, family financial resources, and could result in multiple interrelated court proceedings. Alternative remedies insofar as the trial court in a dissolution proceeding has authority to require an abusive spouse to pay necessary medical expenses and the authority to consider any permanent injury or disfigurement or loss of earning capacity from such abuse when setting alimony.

We reject again the contention that the Married Woman’s Property Act has abolished the interspousal immunity doctrine in this state. Interspousal tort immunity is a judicial doctrine established to protect the family unit. Under common law, the family has had certain responsibilities, obligations, and special protections. The family continues to be an unofficial sociological governmental structure necessary and vital to our free, independent society. We look with great concern upon societies that break up the family unit and entrust children to the state for education and training. Protection of the family unit is a significant public policy and we are greatly concerned by any intrusion that adversely affects the family relationship or the family resources. Intentional interspousal tort claims ordinarily arise in marital disputes which result in dissolution and which can adversely affect all family members, not just the spouses. We conclude that the abolition would be detrimental to the family as a whole. We choose not to place lawyers, judges, litigation costs, and the full trappings of an adversary tort system into a family dispute while the parties remain married. The ramifications of that type of action are not in any way conducive to a reconciliation. We recognize that intentional tortious conduct by one spouse against the other clearly shows marital disharmony and, in many instances of serious tortious conduct by one spouse against the other, dissolution proceeding follows. Besides issues of contingent fees that might have to be agreed upon between a spouse and a lawyer in such suits, we also find that a separate tort action in an interspousal dispute could be used as simply a legal tool to achieve a better settlement in the dissolution proceeding. It makes no sense to have different courts and separate proceedings determine interrelated issues between spouses.

Florida, interspousal immunity, law, case briefs, family law, Hill v. Hill, mental incompetency, Married Woman’s Property Act, dissolution proceeding, torts

NATURE OF THE CASE: Borelli (P), wife, challenged a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend her complaint against Brusseau (D), daughter of decedent and executor of his estate. P’s complaint sought specific performance of decedent’s promise to transfer property to her in return for her promise to care for him at home after he suffered a stroke.

FACTS: Borelli (P) and decedent entered into an antenuptial (i.e. prenuptial agreement or prenup) contract on April 24, 1980 and were married the next day. Borelli remained married to decedent until his death on January 25, 1989. During their marriage, decedent became concerned about his health and heart problems and discussed final dispositions of his property with Borelli. He told her that he intended to leave the following property to her. 1. An interest in a lot in Sacramento, California. 2. A life estate for the use of a condominium in Hawaii. 3. A 25 percent interest in Borelli Meat Co. 4. All cash remaining in all existing bank accounts at the time of his death. 5. The costs of educating decedent’s stepdaughter, Monique Lee. 6. Decedent’s entire interest in a residence in Kensington, California. 7. All furniture located in the residence. 8. Decedent’s interest in a partnership. 9. Health insurance for appellant and Monique Lee.

Decedent wanted to be cared for in his home and promised to leave the property to her if Borelli would care for him in his home for the duration of his illness. Borelli performed but the decedent did not honor his word as the will bequeathed Brusseau the sum of $100,000 and his interest in the residence that was owned as joint tenants. The bulk of the estate went to Brusseau, the decedent’s daughter.

Borelli sued the estate to enforce the promise by specific performance. Brusseau demurred and the trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case without leave to amend. Borelli appealed.

ISSUE: May spouses legally contract for support between one another?

RULE OF LAW: No. Spouses may not legally contract for support between one another.

HOLDING AND DECISION (Perley): There is a public policy interest in the formation and dissolution of marriage. California Civil Code requires each of the following: Every individual shall support his or her spouse. A husband and wife cannot, by any contract with each other, alter their legal relations, except as to property. Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support. Either husband or wife may enter into any transaction with the other respecting property, which either might if unmarried. A married person shall support the person’s spouse while they are living together.

A husband and wife assume mutual obligations of support upon marriage. These obligations are not conditioned on the existence of community property or income. Consortium is the legal right of one spouse to the company, affection, and service of the other. Only married persons are allowed to recover damages for loss of consortium. There is far more to the marriage relationship than financial support. The concept of consortium includes not only loss of support or services but also embraces such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace and more. The marital duty of support includes caring for a spouse who is ill.

Support in a marriage means more than the physical care someone could be hired to provide. The duty of support can no more be delegated to a third party than the statutory duties of fidelity and mutual respect. Marital duties are owed by the spouses personally. This is implicit in the definition of marriage as a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman.

A spouse is not entitled to compensation for support, apart from rights to community property and the like that arise from the marital relation itself. Personal performance of a personal duty created by the contract of marriage does not constitute a new consideration supporting the indebtedness, alleged in this case. Marriage is not a business proposition as it continues to be defined by statute as a personal relationship of mutual support. Marital support remains one of the things that cannot command a price.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

DISSENT (Poche): Had there been no marriage and had they been total strangers, there is no doubt Mr. Borelli could have validly contracted to receive her services in exchange for certain of his property. The mere existence of a marriage certificate should not deprive competent adults of the utmost freedom of contract they would otherwise possess.

California, family law, case briefs, law, support and maintenance, contracts, public policy, Borelli v. Brusseau, marital contracts

NATURE OF THE CASE: Appellant, debtor’s husband, sought review of a judgment in favor of respondent retailer in respondent’s action against appellant and debtor to recover the cost of a sofa purchased on credit by debtor, the Appellant’s wife.

FACTS: Ms. Buckstaff (D) signed a special order with Sharpe Furniture, Inc. (P) for a sofa whereby she agreed to pay $621.50 within 60 days after receiving the sofa from the factory. Interest at a rate of 1.5 percent per month was charged on the unpaid balance after the 60 day period. Mrs. Buckstaff made no representations to Sharpe Furniture that she was acting on behalf of her husband in purchasing the furniture. Mr. Buckstaff had previously written to the local credit bureau service to notify that office that he would not be responsible for any credit extended to his wife.

The sofa was delivered to the residence of the defendants in February 1974 and remained a part of the home from the time of its delivery even though no one ever tendered payment. Sharpe Furniture sued the Buckstaffs and the trial court found that Ms. Buckstaff was liable on her contract and that John Buckstaff was also liable for the amount due under the common law doctrine of necessaries. The court of appeals affirmed and the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted cert.

ISSUE: 1) Under the common law doctrine of necessaries and in the absence of any contractual obligation on his part, may a husband be held liable for necessary items purchased on credit by his wife? 2) What must the plaintiff-creditor prove in an action for recovery of the value of necessaries supplied on credit to a wife?

RULE OF LAW: 1) Yes. Under the common law doctrine of necessaries and in the absence of any contractual obligation on his part, a husband may be held liable to pay for necessary items purchased on credit by his wife. 2) In an action for recovery of the value of necessaries supplied on credit to a wife, it is essential for the plaintiff-creditor to prove either that the husband has failed, refused or neglected to provide the items which have been supplied by the plaintiff-creditor, or that the items supplied were reasonably needed by the wife or the family.

HOLDING AND DECISION (Beilfuss): Under the common law rule of necessaries a husband has a legal obligation to support his wife and nothing but wrongful conduct on her part can free him from such obligation. If he fails to provide her with suitable and proper necessaries, any third person who does provide her with such necessaries may maintain an action against him.

Necessaries are such articles of food, apparel, medicine, medical attendance and nursing, means of transportation, habitation and furniture, or such provision for her protection in society, and the like, as the husband, considering his ability and standing, ought to furnish to his wife for her sustenance and the preservation of her health and comfort. This doctrine traditionally required the creditor to show that he supplied to the wife an item that was, in fact, a necessary and that the defendant had previously failed or refused to provide his wife with this item. If the creditor made his showing he was entitled to recovery as against the husband despite the fact that the husband had not contractually bound himself by his own act or by the act of an agent. This duty is placed upon a husband by virtue of the legal relationship of marriage and arises as an obligation placed on him as a matter of public policy.

The sustenance of the family unit is accorded a high order of importance in the scheme of Wisconsin law. It has been codified as a part of our statutes and recognized as a part of our case law. We view the nature of the husband’s liability as a contractual duty implied in law, i.e., a quasi-contractual obligation. When an item or service is obtained for the benefit of the family, which is necessary, and no payment for that item or service has been made, the elements of an action for an implied-in-law contract exist and the husband is primarily liable.

The creditor need only show that the item was reasonably needed by the wife or family and not that the husband wilfully refused to provide his wife with the necessary item. We have reviewed the stipulation of the parties in this matter and we are satisfied that ample evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that the Henredon sofa was a legally necessary item. The sofa has been in use in the Buckstaff home since its delivery. Such continued use gives rise to an inference of reasonable need.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

CONCURRING (Abrahamson): I do not agree with that portion of the opinion in which the court adopts a rule placing primary liability on the husband to the creditor for necessaries supplied to the family. If the common law doctrine of necessaries is to survive as a rule of law it must be modified in accordance with the developing laws recognizing equal rights and responsibilities of both marital partners and the changes in the economic and social conditions of society. The common law doctrine of necessaries was premised on the legal disability of the married woman and on the husband’s duty to support. Today, the married woman is free to contract, and the duty of support rests not on the husband alone but on both the husband and wife.

The rule that a husband is primarily liable for necessities is not in harmony with the legislatively established public policy of this state which is to impose the obligation to support on both the husband and wife on the basis of their respective economic resources and not on one spouse or the other on the basis of gender. This rule discriminates against men and thus contravenes the state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection of law.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case was an action in equity brought by Ms. McGuire to recover maintenance and support.

FACTS: Ms. Lydia McGuire (P) had two daughters from a previous marriage which ended with her first husband’s death in 1914. P and her daughters each inherited a one third interest in her first husband’s property in Dixon County, Nebraska.

P married Charles McGuire (D) in 1919 when her daughters were aged 11 and 9. The McGuires had no children together and P was 66 years old and D was 80 at the time of this action. H had no dependents other than W. During the last four years of their marriage D had given no money to P.

D owned separate property including 398 acres of land valued at $90,000, bank deposits totaling $12,500, and government bonds in the amount of $104,500. D had an income of approximately $8,500 per year. A decree for support and maintenance was entered in favor of P and D appealed.

ISSUE: May a wife seek a bill in equity to compel a husband to pay support and maintenance while the couple is still living together without asking for a divorce?

RULE OF LAW: No. A wife may not seek a bill in equity to compel a husband to pay support and maintenance while the couple is still living together without asking for a divorce.

HOLDING AND DECISION (Messmore): P has been supported in the same manner during the last 33 years without complaint. To maintain an action in equity the parties must be separated or living apart from each other. In this case the parties have not separated and are still living together. A court cannot interfere with the living standards of a family.

DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss.

DISSENT (Yeager): Is there less reason to support a wife who has been denied maintenance in the home than one who lives separate and apart? There are no cases that require separation as a condition precedent to maintain this action in equity.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This Supreme Court family law case involved an issue of whether ERISA preempts state law relating to employee retirement benefit plans.

FACTS: Isaac Boggs (H) worked for South Central Bell from 1949 until his retirement in 1985. He and his first wife Dorothy Boggs had three sons. After Dorothy died in 1979 Isaac married Sandra Boggs. Isaac and Sandra remained married until his death in 1989.

Upon retirement Isaac Boggs received a lump sum distribution of $151,600 from his employer Bell which he rolled over into an IRA. H made no withdrawals from that account and it was worth $180,000 when he died. H also received 96 shares of AT&T stock and a monthly retirement income of $1,777.67 from Bell South’s Retirement Program.

A dispute erupted between Sandra and Isaac’s children from his first marriage. The sons claimed a portion of the benefits from their mother’s will as Dorothy bequeathed 1/3 of her estate to H and a lifetime usufruct in the remaining 2/3rds. The sons then obtained ownership of the 2/3rds subject to H’s usufruct. Sandra contested the validity of Dorothy’s 1980 testamentary transfer based on H’s will, which gave Sandra certain property including the family home and a lifetime usufruct in the remainder of his estate with the naked ownership interest being held by the sons. Sandra argued that the sons’ competing claim based on the purported transfer of her community property interest in undistributed pension plan benefits is preempted by ERISA.

The sons filed suit and Sandra filed a complaint in U.S. District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that ERISA preempts Louisiana community property law. The lower court ruled in favor of the sons and found that Dorothy had a valid community property interest in the plan. The court held that giving her property interest to her sons was not an assignment or an alienation and as such did not violate 29 U.S.C. §1056(d)(1).

The trial court held that H had not transferred anything as the property belonged to Dorothy under Louisiana community property law. Sandra Boggs appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted cert.

ISSUE: Does the federal ERISA statute supersede state laws relating to employee benefit plans?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. The federal ERISA statute supersedes state laws relating to employee benefit plans.

HOLDING AND DECISION (Kennedy): Our ruling must be consistent with the congressional scheme to assure the security of plan participants and their families in every state. The ERISA act states very clearly that it shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan. Federal law preempts and supersedes state law and requires the surviving spouse annuity to be paid to her as the sole beneficiary.

The statutory object of the qualified joint and survivor annuity provisions was to ensure a stream of income to surviving spouses. This solicitude for the economic security of surviving spouses would be undermined by allowing predeceased spouse’s heirs and legatees to have a community property interest in the survivor’s annuity. Even a plan participant cannot defeat a nonparticipant surviving spouse’s statutory entitlement to an annuity. It would be odd to say the least, if Congress permitted a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse to do so. Community property law has in the past been preempted in order to ensure the implementation of a federal statutory scheme.

DISPOSITION: Reversed.

Boggs v. Boggs, law, case briefs, family law, Supreme Court, ERISA, community property, Louisiana, choice of law, retirement benefits

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a dispute over the legal definition of the word family.

FACTS: Diane Vallorosi (D) purchased a home in a restricted residential zone to provide a home for Diane’s brother Peter Vallorosi and the son of two partners in a real estate investment partnership. It was contemplated that nine of Peter’s friends would share the house with him when they attended Glassboro State College.

The Borough of Glassboro (D) commenced an action seeking an injunction against the use of the house by the students on the grounds that the occupants did not constitute a family as defined by Glassboro’s ordinance. The trial court found that the occupancy of the students constituted a single housekeeping unit as defined by the ordinance and the Borough of Glassboro appealed.

ISSUE: Must the standard of what constitutes a single housekeeping unit be functional and hence capable of being satisfied by either related or unrelated persons?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. The standard of what constitutes a single housekeeping unit must be functional and hence capable of being satisfied by either related or unrelated persons.

HOLDING AND DECISION: The uncontradicted testimony reflects a plan by these 10 sophomore students to live together for three years under conditions that correspond substantially to the ordinance’s requirement of a stable and permanent living unit. The students ate together and shared household chores and paid expenses from a common fund. We will not upset the lower court’s conclusion that the occupancy shows stability, permanency and can be described as the functional equivalent of a family.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This case involved a dispute over a zoning ordinance law that defined family as ‘blood, marriage, or adoption.’

FACTS: Certain zones in the city of Ladue (P) were designated as one family residential in an ordinance for which the stated purpose was the health, safety, morals and general welfare. The Horns (D) purchased a home located in the single family residential zone of Ladue. They were not married and between them had three children, two of whom attended universities and were not home most of the time. Ladue demanded that the Horns vacate the household because they were not a family as the term applies under the ordinance. The Horns refused to vacate and Ladue sued for injunctive relief. The trial court entered a permanent injunction in favor of Ladue and the Horns appealed contending that the ordinance violated the right to freedom of association and privacy.

ISSUE: Do a man and a woman living together and sharing certain pleasures and responsibilities per se constitute a family?

RULE OF LAW: No. A man and a woman living together and sharing certain pleasures and responsibilities does not per se constitute a family.

HOLDING AND DECISION: To have a family relationship there must be a commitment to a permanent relationship and a perceived reciprocal obligation to support and care for each other. The Horns and their children do not even constitute a nontraditional family. The ordinance deals with economic and social legislation and not with a fundamental interest or a suspect classification.

The test is whether the ordinance is reasonable and not arbitrary and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective. The Horn’s arguments for expanding the definition of family as set forth in the ordinance are unpersuasive. Ladue has defined a family in precise language as those people related by blood, marriage, or adoption.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

Ladue v. Horn, Missouri, law, family law, case briefs, freedom of association, right to privacy, permissible state objective, non-marital relationships

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a dispute over a rent-controlled apartment.

FACTS: Braschi (P) and Leslie Blanchard were homosexual life partners living together in a rent-controlled apartment for which Blanchard was the tenant of record. Blanchard died in September 1986 and in November 1986 Stahl (D) served notice for Braschi to vacate the apartment. Stahl alleged that Braschi and Blanchard were not a family and that therefore under the rent control provisions Braschi was a mere licensee and was not entitled to remain in the rent controlled apartment. The issue at trial was the definition of the word “family” in the rent control provisions. Braschi was evicted and appealed.

ISSUE: Does the term “family” in the rent control provisions include homosexual life partners?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. The term “family” in the rent control provisions includes same sex life partners.

HOLDING AND DECISION: A family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence. A family defined by Webster’s Dictionary is a group of people united by certain convictions of common affiliation.

Braschi should be afforded the opportunity to prove that he and Blanchard were a family. The lower court should look to the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance placed upon on each other for daily family services.

Braschi and Blanchard lived together and held themselves out as spouses. The tenants were known to the building superintendent and doorman who both viewed the two men as a couple. These two shared joint checking and savings accounts, held three safe deposit boxes jointly, and rent was often paid from the joint account. Blanchard executed a power of attorney so that Braschi could make necessary financial, medical, and personal decisions for him during his illness and named Braschi the beneficiary of his life insurance policy as well as primary legatee and coexecutor of his estate. A court could reasonably conclude that these men were more than mere roommates.

DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.

DISSENT: The majority has extended the definition of family to include anyone with an emotional and financial commitment. The regulation’s intent can only be applied by a definition of family to include objectively verifiable relationships based on blood, marriage and adoption as the State has historically done in estate succession laws, family court acts, and similar legislation.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a dispute over the ability to modify a custody decree once a new home state is established.

FACTS: H and W were married in 1978 and their son Alex was born the same year. The marriage dissolved in 1982 when the Alex was 3 years old and W was granted custody. In 1985, when Alex was seven years old, W accepted a three year assignment with the United States Army in Germany.

W placed Alex in a German speaking boarding school during that time and the boy only saw his mother on occasional weekends and holidays. W and the boy relocated to California in 1988 and moved a total of four times between 1988 and 1990. Alex attended three different schools during that time. W enrolled in law school in San Jose in 1990. During that time Alex lived with her former boyfriend in Berkeley and only saw his mother on weekends and school vacations.

Alex saw a counselor while visiting his father in Tacoma who recommended that he live with the father after concluding that the mother had effectively abandoned Alex.

W denied allegations of abandonment and neglect. In 1991, H petitioned the Pierce County Court in Washington State to obtain custody. W responded by stating that California had jurisdiction. The court denied W’s motion, holding that Washington had significant contacts with the child and because an emergency existed. W appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed holding that Washington did not have subject matter jurisdiction and this appeal resulted.

ISSUE: Does a state have continuing jurisdiction to modify its own custody orders after a child and custodial parent have established residence in another state?

RULE OF LAW: A state has continuing jurisdiction to modify its own custody orders after a child and custodial parent have established residence in another state, provided the child has continuing contacts with the state that are more than slight, and one of the parents remains in the state.

HOLDING AND DECISION: The UCCJA has provisions that allow a decree state continuing jurisdiction to modify its own custody orders. Under the UCCJA all petitions for modification are to be addressed to the prior state if that state has sufficient minimum contacts with the case to satisfy the UCCJA requirements. Exclusive continuing jurisdiction is not affected by the child’s residence in another state for six months or more. Even though the new state becomes the child’s home, significant connection jurisdiction continues in the state of the prior decree when the court record and other evidence exists in the original state and when one parent continues to reside therein.

The PKPA requires that the state have jurisdiction to modify a custody decree under the state’s own laws. The court must clearly distinguish between jurisdiction to determine initial custody and jurisdiction to modify a prior custody order. Under the present case that distinction was not made. Both the trial court and the appeals court failed to consider the presumption created by the UCCJA and PKPA that the decree state had continuing jurisdiction to modify its own order and other states must decline to do so until the decree state loses or declines jurisdiction.

Exclusive jurisdiction is maintained if one of the parents continues to reside in that state and the child has some connection with the decree state. Under these facts the father still resides in the state and the child visits him there. The local court also has all the files on this case regarding the history of the litigation, and the child has extended family from both the mother and the father in the state. The child is also mature enough to express his own opinion regarding with whom he wishes to live and he wants to live with his father. The denial of California jurisdiction was not an abuse of discretion based on the fact that California is the more convenient forum.

DISPOSITION: Reversed.

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