NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved the issue of determining the legal status of both spouses of a bigamist.

FACTS: At the time of his death, Edward Spearman held an insurance policy from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for $10,000. The policy provided that if no beneficiary were designated the proceeds were to be paid to the widow of the insured. The policy in this case did not name a beneficiary and both parties claimed to be his widow and sought to collect the proceeds of the policy.

Mary Spearman married the insured on October 2, 1946, in Russell County, Alabama. Viva Spearman married insured on June 7, 1962, in Monterey County, California. The trial court found in favor of the first wife as the second did not establish that the first wife’s marriage to the insured had been terminated by either divorce or annulment. The second wife appealed.

ISSUE: Under California law, how is the legal marital status determined of each spouse of an alleged bigamist?

RULE OF LAW: Under California law, the first spouse has the initial burden of proof to establish that her marriage has not been dissolved. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the second wife to establish that the first marriage had been dissolved. Otherwise, the first wife is deemed to have established her status as the lawful wife.

HOLDING AND DECISION: The first wife must establish that her marriage had not been dissolved by death, divorce, or annulment at the time of the second marriage. To rebut the presumption in favor of the second marriage, the first spouse need examine the records of only those jurisdictions in which either she or her husband have been domiciled.

If the first wife shows that an examination of the pertinent records of such jurisdictions and all of the available evidence demonstrate that her marriage remains undissolved, the burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the first marriage then shifts to the second spouse. Unless the second wife then can establish that her husband’s first marriage has been dissolved, the first wife qualifies as the lawful widow.

Even if the second wife cannot qualify as the insured’s widow, she may nevertheless be entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the life insurance policy as insured’s “putative spouse.” A putative spouse is one whose marriage is legally invalid but who has engaged in a marriage ceremony or otherwise has a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage. The essential basis of such marriage is the belief that it is valid. A putative spouse is entitled to the same share in the property as the legal spouse under the community property laws.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

FACTS: Ms. May died in 1945. Mr. May objected to Alice, one of six children born from the marriage of W and H for issuance to her of letters of administration of the estate of her mother. H claimed to be the husband of W; however, H was W’s uncle. Alice contends that H is not the surviving husband of W because although their marriage was legal in Rhode Island, the marriage never had validity in New York where they were residents until W’s death. W and H were married in Rhode Island at the home of a Jewish rabbi. They returned to New York two weeks later and lived there from 1913 until W’s death in 1945. Rhode Island laws prohibited the marriage of an uncle and niece except for couples of the Jewish faith within the degrees of affinity and consanguinity permitted by their religion. Alice was granted letters of administration and this appeal resulted. That result was overruled by the Appellate Division and this appeal resulted.

ISSUE: Is the legality of a marriage between persons sui juris to be determined by the law of the place it is celebrated?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. The legality of a marriage between persons sui juris is to be determined by the law of the place it is celebrated.

HOLDING AND DECISION: Although our statute declares a marriage between an uncle and niece to be void, our statute does not state that we cannot recognize such a relationship that is valid in another state. We should not extend the statute’s scope to by judicial construction.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

Dissenting: Every state has the right to determine the marital status of its residents. The general rule that a marriage that is valid where solemnized is valid everywhere does not apply to marriages contrary to the prohibitions of natural law or the express prohibitions of a statute.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a review of the denial of insurance benefits under widow status.

FACTS: Elizabeth (P) married John J. Dolan in 1914. A son was born into the marriage. John Dolan left to work in Peru and returned in 1920-21 for six months and then took his wife and son to Peru with him. Elizabeth and the son returned to New York and John joined them in 1925-26. A year later he returned to South America. After a year all contact with the husband ceased and when they contacted his employer they found that his whereabouts were unknown. Elizabeth married another man and the marriage license recited that she was a widow. Elizabeth’s new husband died in 1949 and Elizabeth received retirement benefits.

Two years later John Dolan reappeared and Elizabeth and John reconciled. After John’s death, the son made a claim for burial expenses and made the affidavit out that he was John’s nephew as his father had determined years earlier to label his son. There was no evidence of a divorce or annulment. The Railroad Retirement board asked for its money back and Elizabeth claimed poverty. Summary judgment was given against Elizabeth based on the validity of the second marriage and this appeal resulted.

ISSUE: Can a court declare a prior marriage dissolved and a subsequent one valid if such a declaration would have the effect of disinheriting the spouse of the earlier marriage without any offsetting advantage in terms of the legitimacy of children or the sharing in the estate by the spouse or children of the second marriage?

RULE OF LAW: No. A court cannot declare a prior marriage dissolved and a subsequent one valid if such a declaration would have the effect of disinheriting the spouse of the earlier marriage without any offsetting advantage in terms of the legitimacy of children or the sharing in the estate by the spouse or children of the second marriage.

The cases that have held the subsequent marriage to be valid are based on public policy for upholding legitimacy or favoring the participation in the decedent’s estate and preserving the validity of a marriage when there is no strong public policy that would be served by doing otherwise. Elizabeth has met her burden of proof by coming forward with evidence supporting the continuance of the first marriage.

DISPOSITION: Reversed – judgment for Dolan.