NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a dispute over the issuance of a marriage license to a fourteen-year-old female.

FACTS: Barbara Haven, a fourteen year old female, sought to marry the 22 year old son of his father’s second wife. Her father granted his consent to the marriage. Haven was below the minimum age requirement for marriage in Pennsylvania and requested an order from the court to grant a marriage license.

ISSUE: In order to get married below the state’s legal minimum age requirement for marriage, must a party show more than love and mere physical ability?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. In order to get married below the state’s legal minimum age requirement for marriage, a party must show more than love and mere physical ability.

While Haven is physically suited for marriage, she has completed her education through the eighth grade. She testified that she has been in love with her stepbrother for two years and believes that her love for him is genuine and permanent. He is her first boyfriend although she has attended school dances with other boys. The man she seeks to marry appears industrious and ambitious and there is no observable reason why he should not be married.

The legislature has established a minimum age for marriage through legislation as a matter of public policy because it sought to prevent young people from becoming married before considering with calm deliberation whether the step is both desirable and safe. In this concept there has been ample support in aphorism and precept. The statute fulfills a two-fold function in protecting marriage as an estate and in placing a restraining hand upon the shoulder of impetuous youth. Our duty directs our attention to the interest of society in marriage, but it also commands us to consider the best interests of the minor as well.

When the legislature conferred jurisdiction upon us to set aside the general rule in favor of special cases it could not have meant that our discretion was to be exercised in commonplace situations such as obtains here. There is more to marriage than physical and mental development. It requires mature understanding and judgment; mature emotional stability. There are no special circumstances herein to make the order prayed for.

DISPOSITION: Order for marriage license denied.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a suit for wrongful discharge after the plaintiff was fired for practicing polygamy.

FACTS: Potter (P) was terminated from his employment as a police officer in Murray City, Utah after the city learned that he practiced plural marriage. The City discharged Potter on the grounds that he failed to support, obey, and defend the Utah State Constitution by practicing polygamy. Potter sued for wrongful discharge, asserting that his termination was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Potter appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his claim on summary judgment.

Potter argued on appeal that:1) Utah’s enabling act was void under the equal footing doctrine for requiring that Utah forever prohibit bigamy; 2) Murray City violated his First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion; 3) his termination was in violation of his fundamental right of privacy; and 4) his termination was a violation of due process and equal protection because Utah’s laws prohibiting polygamy had not been enforced.

ISSUE: Do laws prohibiting polygamy violate the guarantees of the free exercise of religion and privacy in the U.S. Constitution?

RULE OF LAW: No. Laws prohibiting polygamy do not violate the guarantees of the free exercise of religion and privacy in the U.S. Constitution.

HOLDING AND DECISION: The court held that even if Utah’s Enabling Act violates the equal footing doctrine plaintiff would not be entitled to relief. Each state is equal in power, dignity, and authority and a state’s sovereign power may not be constitutionally diminished by any conditions in the acts under which the State was admitted to the Union.

Conditions on statehood imposed by Congress would not restrict the State’s legislative power regarding matters that are not plainly within the regulating power of Congress. The State of Utah had full power to enact or amend its laws regarding any constitutional or statutory provisions dealing with the subject of marriage consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

The prohibition of bigamy is the settled public policy of Utah. Monogamy is inextricably woven into the fabric of our society and is the bedrock upon which our culture is built. The State is justified by a compelling interest in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship. We find no authority for extending the constitutional right of privacy to protect polygamous marriages.

P argues that Utah’s laws prohibiting polygamy have fallen into disuse insofar as there have been fewer than 25 prosecutions in Utah since 1952. That there have been a minimal number of prosecutions does not establish an abandonment of the State’s laws. A mere failure to prosecute other offenders is no basis for a finding of denial of equal protection.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case addressed the issue of mental capacity to enter into marriage.

FACTS: Harold Edwards (D) was born in 1918 and was institutionalized in a mental institution for the retarded in 1939. After living in the home for 30 years Edwards met Inez, another patient. Edwards was later able to obtain employment and move into his own apartment. He performed well at his job and earned promotions and raises.

Edwards and Inez eventually became married. Edmunds (P), a guardian, sought to annul the marriage two years later. The trial court determined that Edwards was mildly retarded. Experts for both parties presented conflicting evidence and expert testimony regarding whether he was competent to enter into a marriage. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Edwards. Edmunds appealed and the Nebraska Supreme Court granted cert.

ISSUE: Is mere weakness of mind sufficient to void a marriage based on competency to marry?

RULE OF LAW: No. Mere weakness of mind is not sufficient to void a marriage based on competency to marry.

HOLDING AND DECISION: Mere weakness of mind will not void a marriage unless it produces a derangement sufficient to destroy the power to consent, thereby rendering all contracts void. While a marriage is a civil contract and differs dramatically from other contracts, the standard for determining capacity to consent to marriage is the same as the standard under contract law.

Experts on both sides presented conflicting evidence and testimony regarding mental capacity. When there is irreconcilable conflict over issues of material fact, the court will give considerable weight to the determinations of the trier of fact. Under these facts the trial court was correct in dismissing Edmunds’s petition for annulment.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a dispute over a property division between an unmarried couple.

FACTS: Victoria Hewitt (P) and Robert Hewitt (D) met in college. When P became pregnant D told her that a marriage ceremony was not required and that they should live together as husband and wife. P and D held themselves out as married to their relatives and the community.

P filed a complaint against (D) for divorce and it was determined that no wedding had ever taken place and that a common law marriage did not exist between the couple. P sought child support for three minor children and a property division. P alleged that D had promised to share property with her and that his promise gave rise to an implied contract and that P detrimentally and reasonably relied on those promises.

P also alleged that she helped D establish his career and that she was entitled to a share of his $80,000 per year salary and large amounts of property accumulated during their relationship. The trial court dismissed P’s complaint and the court of appeals reversed on the grounds that P’s conduct had not so affronted public policy as to be denied any and all relief.

ISSUE: 1) Is marriage by estoppel a valid concept? 2) Must public policy limits be narrowly and exactly applied?

RULE OF LAW: 1) No. Marriage by estoppel is not a valid concept. 2) No. Public policy limits need not be narrowly and exactly applied.

HOLDING AND DECISION: Whether or not Victoria Hewitt’s cause of action should be permitted is a question involving complex public policy considerations with compelling arguments on both sides. It is for the legislature to bring these changes about and not the courts. P’s claims are unenforceable as they contravene public policy, implicit in the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which disfavors the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.

DISPOSITION: Reversed.

The law varies widely from state to state. Most states do not recognize the formation of common law marriages within their own borders – but will consider those that are formed in other states as legal and valid. Other states will recognize them under certain limited circumstances. A lawyer who specializes in family and divorce law within your state should be able to help determine your status.

In Georgia, the person claiming the existence of a common law marriage has the burden of proving its formation. The parties must 1) be able to enter into legally binding contracts, 2) agree to live together as a married couple, and 3) consummate the agreement. All three of these requirements must be met at the same time.

Evidence that can be presented to help prove the existence of a common law marriage includes the following: 1) the couple has lived together as man and wife; 2) the parties have held themselves out to their families and to the world as a married couple; 3) the parties have a reputation throughout the community for being in a married relationship.

The question of whether a common law marriage exists is an issue for the jury or fact finder to decide. The finder of fact in the trial court will assess whether the party asserting its existence has presented sufficient legal evidence to show whether or not it exists.

Note that there is no such thing as a common law divorce. In general all marriages can only be dissolved in the same formal manner no matter how they are formed. You can learn more about these issues by contacting a competent family or divorce law attorney who is licensed to practice in your state.

FACTS: Baker et al. (Ps) were three same sex couples who lived in committed relationships for periods of from 4 to 25 years. The plaintiffs applied for marriage licenses and were refused. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to compel the state to issue marriage licenses to them so that they might enjoy the same rights as married couples who lived together in committed relationships.

The State moved to dismiss their actions for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss and the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court ruled that the Vermont state marriage statutes could not be construed to permit the issuance of licenses to same sex couples and the plaintiffs appealed.

ISSUE: Under a state constitution that guarantees that all citizens will be treated equally, must the state afford some equivalent of marriage and its status to same sex couples?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. Under a state constitution that guarantees that all citizens will be treated equally, the state must afford some equivalent of marriage and its status to same sex couples.

Our marriage statutes reflect the commonly accepted position that marriage is an institution for opposite sex couples. However, Ps’ argument is that this exclusion violates their right to the common benefit and protection of the law guaranteed in the Vermont Constitution. Our constitution and this clause differ dramatically from the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Our law and constitution have demanded that statutory exclusions from publicly conferred benefits and protections must be premised on an appropriate and overriding public interest.

When a statute is challenged under this clause, we first examine the statutory basis that distinguishes those protected by the law from those excluded from the State’s protections. Then we look to the purpose in drawing any classifications that include only some members of the community while excluding others. Ultimately, the court must ascertain if the omission of a part of the community from the benefit, protection, and security of the challenged law bears a reasonable relation to the governmental purpose. We must look to the significance of the benefits and protections of the challenged law, whether the omission of members of the community from the benefits and protections of the challenged law promotes the government’s state goals, and if the classification is significantly under-inclusive or over-inclusive.

The court held that under these facts, these laws exclude anyone who wishes to marry someone of the same sex. It is undisputed that many couples marry for reasons other than procreation. Therefore, if these other reasons are significant, then the statutes are under-inclusive and they have no logical connection to the stated governmental goal.

A significant number of children are being raised by same sex couples and this statute provides no protection for those children. The benefits and protections of marriage go well beyond the issues related to child rearing and security for children. As these benefits are significant and important, exclusion from these benefits must be grounded on public concerns of significant weight, cogency, and authority that justice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned. Promoting a link between procreation and child rearing fails to support such exclusions.

There is no doubt that Ps are entitled to the same benefits and protections of the law. How the state legislature accomplishes that by adopting another system for same sex relationships other than marriage is for their exclusive consideration.

DISPOSITION: The judgment upholding the constitutionality of the marriage statutes is reversed and the decision of the court is suspended until the state legislature can act within the guidelines herein mentioned.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over a common law marriage.

FACTS: Fred Chandler (H) was shot during a robbery in the course of his employment as a gas station attendant for Central Oil Corporation and died from his injuries. Fred had three children from three different women including a son, Ruben, who was 33 at the time of Fred’s death. Fred and Ruben’s mother Dorothy were never married. After Fred’s relationship with Dorothy he married three other women and had two other children.

When Fred was married to his second wife Eliza, Eliza did not know that Fred had never obtained a divorce from his first wife, Noletta. Fred married his third wife Mary after living together for three years and they lived together for three more until Fred died.

Both Eliza and Mary claimed to be Fred’s surviving spouse. An Administrative Law Judge and the Director of Workers Compensation determined that a common law marriage existed between Eliza and Fred and determined that under these facts, Fred lacked capacity to enter into a marriage with Mary because his prior common law marriage had not been dissolved. Eliza was therefore entitled to the benefits. Mary appealed and the district court affirmed the ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case with directions to presume the validity of the marriage between Fred and Mary and to provide Eliza with the opportunity to rebut that presumption.

ISSUE: Does the law raise a presumption of the validity of a subsequent marriage?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. The law raises a presumption of the validity of a subsequent marriage.

HOLDING AND DECISION: This presumption is one of the strongest in the law. When an attempt is made to annul a marriage on the ground of a prior subsisting marriage of the other party, the presumption of validity of the subsequent marriage is stronger than and overcomes the presumption of continuance of the previous marriage. One who seeks to impeach the subsequent marriage assumes the burden of proving the evidence so cogent as to compel conviction that the previous marriage has not been dissolved. Eliza now bears that burden of proof. Clear and convincing evidence is not the burden but this must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded. Court of appeals is affirmed and modified.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a lawsuit involving a dispute over the status of an alleged common law marriage.

FACTS: Albert and Edith Renshaw began living together in 1958. They had no formal marriage ceremony and Edith Renshaw testified that they lived together as though they were married and they considered themselves husband and wife. Edith adopted Albert’s last name and changed her social security card. They told couples and friends that they were married including their relatives. H gave W a wedding band shortly after they resided together. They celebrated wedding anniversaries and filed joint tax returns as husband and wife and W was listed as H’s wife in his life insurance policy. The Renshaws had one child.

Albert died and the Secretary of Health and Human Services determined that Edith Renshaw was not married to Albert and therefore was not entitled to widow’s insurance benefits. It was determined that New York law governed the status of the marriage. New York law did not recognize common law marriages, but would recognize such marriages that were formed in states recognizing common law marriages. Pennsylvania recognized common law marriage and W claimed that the marriage formed in Pennsylvania. At trial the court found that at best only sixteen days were spent in Pennsylvania over the 21 year period and as such they did not qualify for a common law marriage. Edith Renshaw appealed.

ISSUE: 1) Is the length of time a couple spends in a state recognizing common law marriage used to determine whether a common law marriage exists? 2) What is the proof of common law marriage?

RULE OF LAW: 1) No. The length of time a couple spends in a state recognizing common law marriage is not used to determine whether a common law marriage exists. 2) The proof of common law marriage requires uttering words in the present tense with the intent to establish such a relationship and holding oneself out in a general and broad way to all as being married.

Even though W spent little time in Pennsylvania, there is considerable proof that there was extensive cohabitation and that they held themselves out as married to all. Under Pennsylvania law, the question of whether a person had been legally married to another is a mixed question of law and fact for the purpose of review. These underlying facts are undisputed and we are not bound by the substantial standard of review on this issue. Accordingly we hold that the Secretary of Health and Human Services erred when he concluded that W and H were not married.

Disposition: Reversed; for Renshaw.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This was a dispute over the existence of a common law marriage.

FACTS: Mr. and Ms. Staudenmayer were married in a civil ceremony in December 1984. They lived together from 1976 until their separation in 1992. H filed for divorce in 1992 and the trial court held the equitable distribution hearing in 1996.

The main issue was a tort settlement that H received from a personal injury lawsuit in 1983. The tort claim was settled and H was awarded $600 per month and a lump sum of $70,000. H argued that this property was not marital property because they were not married. W claimed that they had a common law marriage as early as 1978. W testified that they maintained joint checking accounts and that she began to use H’s last name and had changed her Social Security card, driver’s license, and credit cards to her new identity. The deed to their home listed them as husband and wife with tenants by entirety. They filed federal income taxes jointly as a married couple. However, upon the birth of her daughter Ms. Staudenmayer indicated that she was not married on the birth certificate.

The trial court declared the tort settlement not to be marital property in that W failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that W and H had a reputation of marriage. W had told her immediate family that W and H were not married. The Superior court reversed and this appeal resulted.

ISSUE: Is a common law marriage to be formed between parties by express words of agreement with the burden of proof on the party to show by clear and convincing evidence that such was the case?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. A common law marriage is to be formed between parties by express words of agreement. The party asserting the existence of the common law marriage has the burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that the marriage was formed.

HOLDING AND DECISION: Courts look upon common law marriages with great disfavor because of the ability to create mischief between the parties. Under common law marriage laws there must therefore be clear and convincing evidence of its existence and the courts will review such a claim with great scrutiny. The party bearing the burden of proof must prove continual cohabitation and a reputation for marriage, which is not partial or divided but is broad and general and thus will raise a rebuttable presumption of marriage. The court held that Ms. Staudenmayer’s claim of common law marital status in 1978 contradicted her admission that she indicated in the support papers filed in 1993 that she was unmarried at the time her daughter was born.

DISPOSITION: Reversed; for Mr. Staudenmayer.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This lawsuit involved an issue regarding the recognition of a proxy marriage.

FACTS: Mr. Farah was a citizen of Algeria and Ms. Farah was a citizen of Pakistan. At the time of this lawsuit they had resided in Virginia for several years. The parties signed a proxy marriage form used to solemnize marriages in certain Muslin communities. The contract, known as the Nikah, provided that Mr. Farah would receive a dowry of $20,000. In 1988, the parties purported to enter into a Muslim marriage through proxies in London, England. Neither party was present during the ceremony. While no marriage certificate was issued and no governmental authority was informed, according to Islamic law they were married. One month later, when they went to Pakistan, W’s father held the Rukhsati. The parties returned to Virginia and purchased a house that was jointly titled in both names. Mr. and Ms. Farah intended to have a civil marriage ceremony but they never did so. They lived together for one year and then separated.

Mr. Farah’s divorce lawyer filed a bill to have the marriage voided and W filed for divorce and equitable distribution. H produced evidence that the marriage did not conform to the laws of England because they neither obtained a marriage license nor complied with any other formalities. Ms. Farah contends that the marriage was completed in Pakistan by conducting the Rukhsati and the proxy marriage was also valid in Pakistan. The trial court ruled for W and H appealed.

ISSUE: In Virginia, is whether a marriage is valid to be controlled by the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. In Virginia, whether a marriage is valid is to be controlled by the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated.

HOLDING AND DECISION: The court held that under these facts, the ceremony performed in Pakistan was not a marriage ceremony and therefore this was not a legal marriage. Even Pakistan would not accept the proxy marriage that was performed in London as valid. No evidence was ever established that a marriage ceremony was conducted in Pakistan or that it was celebrated in any jurisdiction other than England. Thus, because the marriage was contracted and celebrated in England, the validity must come from English law. None of the formalities of English law were complied with and thus there was no marriage that this state can recognize. W and H did not enter into a common law marriage as Virginia does not recognize such relationships and Mr. and Ms. Farah did not even enter into such a relationship in any jurisdiction that recognizes common law marriage.

DISPOSITION: Reversed.