Commonwealth v. Twitchell – Compulsory Medical Treatment
Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114, 617 N.E.2d 609 (1993).
NATURE OF THE CASE: David and Ginger Twitchell appealed their criminal convictions for involuntary manslaughter.
FACTS: Robyn, the two and one-half year old son of David and Ginger Twitchell, died from peritonitis caused by the perforation of his bowel due to an anomaly called Meckel’s diverticulum which can be corrected through surgery with a high success rate. The Twitchells believed in healing by spiritual treatment and during Robyn’s five-day illness they retained a Christian Science practitioner, a Christian Science nurse, and consulted with a Church authority named Nathan Talbot. The Twitchells read a church publication concerning the legal rights and obligations of Christian Scientists in Massachusetts. That publication quoted a portion of the relevant Massachusetts state law which, at least in the context of the crimes described in that section, accepted remedial treatment by spiritual means as satisfying any parental obligation not to neglect a child or to provide a child with physical care.
The intensity of Robyn’s distress fluctuated, perhaps causing his parents to believe that prayer would lead to the healing of the illness. Robyn died and David and Ginger Twitchell were charged with involuntary manslaughter.
The Twitchells argued that the spiritual treatment provision of the Massachusetts statute protected them from any criminal liability for the death of their son. The Twitchells contended that they had no fair warning that the use of their spiritual treatment could form the basis for a manslaughter prosecution based on an opinion of the State Attorney General that was relied upon in the church publication. The trial court refused to instruct that the Twitchells reasonably believed they could rely on spiritual treatment to avoid criminal liability and the Twitchells appealed.
ISSUE: Does entrapment by estoppel apply when an official assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal, and the defendant reasonably relies on that advice and continues or initiates the conduct even though the official advice was later determined to be wrong?
RULE OF LAW: Yes. Entrapment by estoppel applies when an official assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal, and the defendant reasonably relies on that advice and continues or initiates the conduct even though the official advice was later determined to be wrong.
HOLDING AND DECISION: The Twitchells argued that the spiritual treatment provision of the Massachusetts statute bars a charge of involuntary manslaughter against a parent who relies on spiritual treatment and who does not seek medical attention for his or her child, even if the failure to seek medical treatment would otherwise be wanton or reckless conduct. We disagree.
The Twitchells argued that their conviction was a violation of due process of law because they lacked fair warning that their use of spiritual treatment could form the basis for a prosecution for manslaughter. Fair warning is part of the due process doctrine of vagueness, which requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Fair warning can be denied generally in three different ways: 1) an unforeseeable retroactive judicial interpretation that the spiritual treatment provision does not protect them 2) the existence of contradictory commands in the law, and 3) because they were officially misled by an opinion of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The Twitchells claim that the statute clearly provided protection against criminal prosecution for a statutory crime but did not give fair warning that it did not provide similar protection against prosecution for a more serious common law crime. The spiritual treatment provision protects against criminal charges of neglect and of willful failure to provide proper medical care and says nothing about protection against criminal charges based on wanton or reckless conduct. The fact that a parent’s conduct may at some point lose the protection of the spiritual treatment provision and may become subject to the application of the common law of homicide is not a circumstance that presents a due process fair warning violation.
There was no evidence or legal argument before the trial court to support the contention that they relied directly on or even knew about the opinion by the Attorney General. Ignorance of the law is no defense.
There is justification for treating as a defense the belief that conduct is not a violation of law when a defendant has reasonably relied on an official statement of the law, later determined to be wrong, contained in an official interpretation by the public official who is charged with the responsibility for the interpretation or enforcement of the law defining the offense.
Entrapment by estoppel applies when an official assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal, and the defendant reasonably relies on that advice and continues or initiates the conduct. This is a matter of fairness grounded in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. There must be factual determinations based on the totality of the circumstances attending the prosecution although the authority of the government official making the announcement is obviously a question of law. The Attorney General was acting in an area of official responsibility. He is the chief law officer of the Commonwealth, with the power to set a unified and consistent legal policy for the Commonwealth. He was statutorily empowered to give his opinion upon questions of law submitted to him by the executive or legislative branch. What a person would reasonably conclude that the Attorney General had stated in his opinion regarding these laws is a question for the jury. The Twitchells were entitled to present such an affirmative defense to the jury.
DISPOSITION: Reversed.
DISSENT: The court has determined that spiritual treatment provisions are no defense to common law manslaughter. The Twitchells were not even aware of the opinion of the Attorney General and they relied entirely upon the church publication. They did not even argue that exclusion of the publication was error. The publication was excluded because it was not competent evidence on the issue of manslaughter.