Department of Public Aid ex rel. Cox v. Miller
Department of Public Aid ex rel. Cox v. Miller, 146 Ill. 2d 399, 586 N.E.2d 1251 (1992).
NATURE OF THE CASE: This lawsuit involved a dispute over the effect of a settlement agreement between parties.
FACTS: The Department of Public Aid brought a paternity action on behalf of Monica Cox, a minor. The Department sought a determination that Miller was the father and sought reimbursement for public aid given to Monica and her mother as well as future support.
Miller filed a motion to dismiss based on a 1978 settlement agreement with the child’s mother in which Miller paid $5,000 to the mother and the mother agreed to dismiss a paternity action against him. The 1978 case had been dismissed with prejudice and Miller never admitted paternity. The trial court in this case indicated that the court involved in the 1978 settlement agreement did not make the mandated findings regarding the best interests of the child, and that the settlement agreement was therefore invalid. The trial court in this action denied Miller’s motion and allowed an interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, the appellate court held that no error by the court in the 1978 settlement agreement should be presumed, and had the judge not been satisfied with the settlement he would not have signed the order. The appeals court also held that there was no requirement that the child be represented by a guardian ad litem during the initial paternity action and settlement. The appeals court also pointed out that the Department brought the 1978 action on behalf of the mother. The records show that the mother was represented by a private attorney.
The appeals court in the present action granted leave to appeal and reversed and remanded the case. The Supreme Court of Illinois granted cert.
ISSUE: Is a settlement order and dismissal entered in a paternity action a bar to a subsequent action on behalf of the minor for support?
RULE OF LAW: No. A settlement order and dismissal entered in a paternity action is not a bar to a subsequent action on behalf of the minor for support.
HOLDING AND DECISION: The court held that the Illinois Act expressly prohibits parties to an agreement from limiting or precluding the modification of child support. Further, a court is not bound by the agreement between the parties for the support of children even when a settlement exists between the parents. No marital child is barred from seeking additional support. The Supreme Court has also held that the State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally. Further in the balancing of equities, the strength of the asserted state claim to prevent stale and fraudulent claims is undercut by the countervailing state interest in insuring that genuine claims for child support are satisfied.
This is not only for a desire for justice but also for a desire to reduce the number of individuals forced to enter the welfare rolls. Further, recent scientific developments have dramatically reduced the possibility that a defendant will be falsely accused of being the illegitimate child’s father. Because of this certainty, the State’s interest in finality and promoting settlements does not outweigh the equal protection problems presented by our statutory scheme. A lump sum settlement worked out without the benefit of modern technology is hardly fair particularly when marital children are allowed to petition for more support while illegitimate children are not. We disagree with the appeals court that an action by the child to modify support or obtain more support is barred.
DISPOSITION: Reversed.