NATURE OF THE CASE: In this divorce law case, Ms. Simpson sought a divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and Mr. Simpson asserted insanity as a defense.

FACTS: H and W married with the agreement that H would attend college first, and then W would attend after he graduated. H attended six different colleges but never obtained a degree. H made no real effort to find steady employment. The marriage was turbulent and W testified that H constantly belittled her and complained of her inability to make him happy. H was prone to uncontrolled rage and outbreaks and irrational behavior.

W eventually moved out of the home and filed for divorce based on irreconcilable differences. H kidnapped her with a handgun and told her that he was going to kill her. W testified that she was afraid to live with defendant.

At trial, H moved to dismiss W’s complaint on the basis of the defense of insanity. An expert witness physician testified that H was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. The trial court dismissed the complaint on grounds that H was insane.

The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. The court reasoned that mentally ill persons may be held liable in tort if malice or evil intent is not a necessary element. The court held that it would be anomalous to hold that a spouse can obtain a recovery in a tort action against a mentally ill spouse but cannot obtain a divorce based upon the same facts. The court stated that defendant’s abduction of his wife and threats to kill her were tortious acts incompatible with the marital relationship.

ISSUE: Under what circumstances may a defendant assert insanity as a defense in a divorce action?

RULE OF LAW: A defendant in a divorce action may assert the defense of insanity to the commission of acts of cruelty only if there is proof that at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked sufficient capacity either 1) to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct; or 2) the volition to control his or her acts.

HOLDING AND DECISION: Some courts hold that insanity is a valid defense to an action for divorce without giving consideration to the degree or character of insanity that is relied upon as a defense. The majority of the courts and the better reasoned cases consider the degree and the character of the insanity and what direct effect it has upon the plaintiff’s proof.

To successfully defend a divorce action based upon cruel and inhuman treatment, the defendant has the burden of proving that he or she was not in remission at the time of the commission of all or a sufficient number of the acts of cruelty relied upon by plaintiff and that plaintiff’s proof does not warrant dissolution of the marriage. The testimony of the expert witness fails to establish that defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or the volition to control his actions at the time he committed acts of cruel and inhuman treatment more than sufficient to warrant dissolution of this marriage.

DISPOSITION: Divorce granted.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved the issue of determining the legal status of both spouses of a bigamist.

FACTS: At the time of his death, Edward Spearman held an insurance policy from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for $10,000. The policy provided that if no beneficiary were designated the proceeds were to be paid to the widow of the insured. The policy in this case did not name a beneficiary and both parties claimed to be his widow and sought to collect the proceeds of the policy.

Mary Spearman married the insured on October 2, 1946, in Russell County, Alabama. Viva Spearman married insured on June 7, 1962, in Monterey County, California. The trial court found in favor of the first wife as the second did not establish that the first wife’s marriage to the insured had been terminated by either divorce or annulment. The second wife appealed.

ISSUE: Under California law, how is the legal marital status determined of each spouse of an alleged bigamist?

RULE OF LAW: Under California law, the first spouse has the initial burden of proof to establish that her marriage has not been dissolved. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the second wife to establish that the first marriage had been dissolved. Otherwise, the first wife is deemed to have established her status as the lawful wife.

HOLDING AND DECISION: The first wife must establish that her marriage had not been dissolved by death, divorce, or annulment at the time of the second marriage. To rebut the presumption in favor of the second marriage, the first spouse need examine the records of only those jurisdictions in which either she or her husband have been domiciled.

If the first wife shows that an examination of the pertinent records of such jurisdictions and all of the available evidence demonstrate that her marriage remains undissolved, the burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the first marriage then shifts to the second spouse. Unless the second wife then can establish that her husband’s first marriage has been dissolved, the first wife qualifies as the lawful widow.

Even if the second wife cannot qualify as the insured’s widow, she may nevertheless be entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the life insurance policy as insured’s “putative spouse.” A putative spouse is one whose marriage is legally invalid but who has engaged in a marriage ceremony or otherwise has a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage. The essential basis of such marriage is the belief that it is valid. A putative spouse is entitled to the same share in the property as the legal spouse under the community property laws.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a dispute over the issuance of a marriage license to a fourteen-year-old female.

FACTS: Barbara Haven, a fourteen year old female, sought to marry the 22 year old son of his father’s second wife. Her father granted his consent to the marriage. Haven was below the minimum age requirement for marriage in Pennsylvania and requested an order from the court to grant a marriage license.

ISSUE: In order to get married below the state’s legal minimum age requirement for marriage, must a party show more than love and mere physical ability?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. In order to get married below the state’s legal minimum age requirement for marriage, a party must show more than love and mere physical ability.

While Haven is physically suited for marriage, she has completed her education through the eighth grade. She testified that she has been in love with her stepbrother for two years and believes that her love for him is genuine and permanent. He is her first boyfriend although she has attended school dances with other boys. The man she seeks to marry appears industrious and ambitious and there is no observable reason why he should not be married.

The legislature has established a minimum age for marriage through legislation as a matter of public policy because it sought to prevent young people from becoming married before considering with calm deliberation whether the step is both desirable and safe. In this concept there has been ample support in aphorism and precept. The statute fulfills a two-fold function in protecting marriage as an estate and in placing a restraining hand upon the shoulder of impetuous youth. Our duty directs our attention to the interest of society in marriage, but it also commands us to consider the best interests of the minor as well.

When the legislature conferred jurisdiction upon us to set aside the general rule in favor of special cases it could not have meant that our discretion was to be exercised in commonplace situations such as obtains here. There is more to marriage than physical and mental development. It requires mature understanding and judgment; mature emotional stability. There are no special circumstances herein to make the order prayed for.

DISPOSITION: Order for marriage license denied.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a suit for wrongful discharge after the plaintiff was fired for practicing polygamy.

FACTS: Potter (P) was terminated from his employment as a police officer in Murray City, Utah after the city learned that he practiced plural marriage. The City discharged Potter on the grounds that he failed to support, obey, and defend the Utah State Constitution by practicing polygamy. Potter sued for wrongful discharge, asserting that his termination was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Potter appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his claim on summary judgment.

Potter argued on appeal that:1) Utah’s enabling act was void under the equal footing doctrine for requiring that Utah forever prohibit bigamy; 2) Murray City violated his First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion; 3) his termination was in violation of his fundamental right of privacy; and 4) his termination was a violation of due process and equal protection because Utah’s laws prohibiting polygamy had not been enforced.

ISSUE: Do laws prohibiting polygamy violate the guarantees of the free exercise of religion and privacy in the U.S. Constitution?

RULE OF LAW: No. Laws prohibiting polygamy do not violate the guarantees of the free exercise of religion and privacy in the U.S. Constitution.

HOLDING AND DECISION: The court held that even if Utah’s Enabling Act violates the equal footing doctrine plaintiff would not be entitled to relief. Each state is equal in power, dignity, and authority and a state’s sovereign power may not be constitutionally diminished by any conditions in the acts under which the State was admitted to the Union.

Conditions on statehood imposed by Congress would not restrict the State’s legislative power regarding matters that are not plainly within the regulating power of Congress. The State of Utah had full power to enact or amend its laws regarding any constitutional or statutory provisions dealing with the subject of marriage consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

The prohibition of bigamy is the settled public policy of Utah. Monogamy is inextricably woven into the fabric of our society and is the bedrock upon which our culture is built. The State is justified by a compelling interest in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship. We find no authority for extending the constitutional right of privacy to protect polygamous marriages.

P argues that Utah’s laws prohibiting polygamy have fallen into disuse insofar as there have been fewer than 25 prosecutions in Utah since 1952. That there have been a minimal number of prosecutions does not establish an abandonment of the State’s laws. A mere failure to prosecute other offenders is no basis for a finding of denial of equal protection.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This case involved a suit for divorce and an annulment based on fraud.

FACTS: Mr. and Ms. Wolfe discussed marriage and W informed H that she previously had been married and divorced. H was a Roman Catholic and was prohibited from marrying a divorced woman whose husband was still alive. W later lied to H and told him that her former husband was killed in a car accident and showed him a forged death certificate. If W’s former husband were dead then she would be a widow in the eyes of the Catholic Church, thereby making it possible for H to marry her.

Mr. and Ms. Wolfe became married and W converted to Catholicism. The Wolfes had one child together. The Wolfes separated several years later and W filed for divorce. H filed a counterclaim seeking an annulment for fraud, based on W’s false claim that her former husband was dead.

At trial W’s former husband testified and W admitted to fraud. She plead the Fifth Amendment when questioned about the forged death certificate. H testified that he would not have married W if he believed that her former husband was still alive. The trial court ruled for H and later vacated that judgment. The court of appeals reversed and this appeal resulted.

ISSUE: Under what circumstances can a marriage contract be voided for fraud?

RULE OF LAW: A marriage contract can be voided for fraud only if the fraud itself affects the essentials of the marriage.

HOLDING AND DECISION: The evidence shows that W perpetrated a fraud upon H. The trial court ruled against H on the basis that the fraud must go to the marriage relation such that it would make the performance of duties and obligations of that relation impossible, or render its assumption and continuance dangerous to health or life. H has established that he is a loyal practitioner of Catholicism and his religion prohibits marriage with a divorced person whose former spouse is still living. We are convinced this marriage would not have occurred but for the fraud of W. Since discovering the fraud, H has been unable to continue marital cohabitation with W. This conduct is not a mere subjective personal aversion but something that his religion has commanded H to do. Under these facts, this fraud goes to the essentials of this marriage.

DISPOSITION: Annulment granted.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case addressed the issue of mental capacity to enter into marriage.

FACTS: Harold Edwards (D) was born in 1918 and was institutionalized in a mental institution for the retarded in 1939. After living in the home for 30 years Edwards met Inez, another patient. Edwards was later able to obtain employment and move into his own apartment. He performed well at his job and earned promotions and raises.

Edwards and Inez eventually became married. Edmunds (P), a guardian, sought to annul the marriage two years later. The trial court determined that Edwards was mildly retarded. Experts for both parties presented conflicting evidence and expert testimony regarding whether he was competent to enter into a marriage. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Edwards. Edmunds appealed and the Nebraska Supreme Court granted cert.

ISSUE: Is mere weakness of mind sufficient to void a marriage based on competency to marry?

RULE OF LAW: No. Mere weakness of mind is not sufficient to void a marriage based on competency to marry.

HOLDING AND DECISION: Mere weakness of mind will not void a marriage unless it produces a derangement sufficient to destroy the power to consent, thereby rendering all contracts void. While a marriage is a civil contract and differs dramatically from other contracts, the standard for determining capacity to consent to marriage is the same as the standard under contract law.

Experts on both sides presented conflicting evidence and testimony regarding mental capacity. When there is irreconcilable conflict over issues of material fact, the court will give considerable weight to the determinations of the trier of fact. Under these facts the trial court was correct in dismissing Edmunds’s petition for annulment.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

There are three different ways to become emancipated in the state of California. First, anyone who becomes married with the consent of their parents or guardian and permission from a family court can become emancipated. Second, a person can enlist in the United States military and serve in active duty. The third way is to obtain a declaration of emancipation from a judge through a court order.

The first two methods above are relatively self explanatory. In order for a minor to obtain a declaration of emancipation in the state of California there are five general requirements. First, under California state law, a person must be at least 14 years old. Second, the teenager must already be living apart from his or her parents or guardian with their consent. Third, the minor must earn enough money to pay all of his or her living expenses responsibly, and must make all the decisions about how that money is spent. Furthermore, and not surprisingly, the minor’s income must be legal. Earning a living through crime is not going to persuade the court to grant a declaration of emancipation.

The last requirement is that emancipation must be in the minor’s best interests. Anyone can come to court and argue that emancipation would be detrimental and the judge can deny the court order even if all of the other requirements are met.

For more information, please refer to this Emancipation Guide for the state of California.

General information on becoming an emancipated minor.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This case involved the reproductive rights issue of whether a law requiring spousal consent for an abortion is constitutional.

FACTS: Missouri law required the prior written consent of the spouse of a woman seeking an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy unless the abortion was certified by a licensed physician as necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Danforth (P) opposed that law.

ISSUE: 1) Can the state delegate to a spouse a veto power over abortion which the state itself is prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy? 2) Can the State constitutionally impose a parental consent requirement as a condition for an unmarried minor’s abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy?

RULE OF LAW: 1) No. The state cannot delegate to a spouse a veto power over abortion which the state itself is prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy. 2) No. The State may not constitutionally impose a parental consent requirement as a condition for an unmarried minor’s abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.

HOLDING AND DECISION (Blackmun): The state does not have the constitutional authority to give the spouse the unilateral authority to prohibit the wife from terminating her pregnancy. The State may not constitutionally impose a blanket parental consent requirement as a condition for an unmarried minor’s abortion during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy for substantially the same reasons as in the case of the spousal consent provision. Such requirements further no significant state interests, whether to safeguard the family unit and parental authority or otherwise, in conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent with respect to the pregnant minor. As stressed in Roe v. Wade, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART (White): It does not follow that because the State has no such right the husband should be denied this right or that his interest in his wife’s pregnancy should be denied. A father’s interest in having a child may be unmatched by any other interest in his life.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law related case involved the issue of interspousal immunity in the context of a suit for false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution.

FACTS: Mr. and Ms. Hill married in August 1972 and had a child in 1973. Ms. Hill had two children from a previous marriage. The parties separated in September 1978 and have had a contentious relationship concerning the custody of their minor child. W brought suit for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and abuse of process while dissolution proceedings were pending.

Her complaint alleged that from time to time during the separation she would leave the marital home with the three children. In an effort to have her return home, the husband, upon locating the family, would forcibly remove the parties’ child from the wife’s custody and would threaten to obtain a divorce and sell the marital home. The wife alleged that she believed she could not retain custody in the city of the marital home and therefore moved herself and the children to Tennessee to live in a religious commune.

The wife alleged that H and his lawyer illegally subpoenaed her bank records to locate her. The husband then flew to Tennessee to again take custody of the child. The wife returned to Florida and, with several friends, visited the child at the marital home, at which time the husband called the police and had her vacate the premises. H then sought to have her involuntarily committed for mental illness and succeeded in doing so for one day.

H defended his action with a claim that he had probable cause to have his wife committed. He asserted that his wife had previously experienced a mental breakdown requiring her confinement in a straitjacket; that she had been previously committed for mental incompetency for three and one-half months; that she belonged to a religious cult; and that she had destroyed a new television set claiming it was an instrument of the devil, after which she affixed a makeshift shrine which included a Bible, candles, and other paraphernalia having meaning only to her.

The husband claimed that he did not act maliciously, but only for the safety and welfare of the parties’ five-year-old daughter. The trial court granted summary judgment for the H and held that the claims against him were barred under the interspousal immunity doctrine. The district court affirmed but then certified the question of whether interspousal tort immunity should apply to intentional torts.

ISSUE: Is interspousal immunity a valid defense in Florida?

RULE OF LAW: Yes. Interspousal immunity is a valid defense in Florida.

HOLDING AND DECISION: Neither a wife nor a husband should be required to endure abuse from their spouse without a suitable means of retribution. On the other hand, a means of recovery within the traditional tort system can seriously affect the family unit, family financial resources, and could result in multiple interrelated court proceedings. Alternative remedies insofar as the trial court in a dissolution proceeding has authority to require an abusive spouse to pay necessary medical expenses and the authority to consider any permanent injury or disfigurement or loss of earning capacity from such abuse when setting alimony.

We reject again the contention that the Married Woman’s Property Act has abolished the interspousal immunity doctrine in this state. Interspousal tort immunity is a judicial doctrine established to protect the family unit. Under common law, the family has had certain responsibilities, obligations, and special protections. The family continues to be an unofficial sociological governmental structure necessary and vital to our free, independent society. We look with great concern upon societies that break up the family unit and entrust children to the state for education and training. Protection of the family unit is a significant public policy and we are greatly concerned by any intrusion that adversely affects the family relationship or the family resources. Intentional interspousal tort claims ordinarily arise in marital disputes which result in dissolution and which can adversely affect all family members, not just the spouses. We conclude that the abolition would be detrimental to the family as a whole. We choose not to place lawyers, judges, litigation costs, and the full trappings of an adversary tort system into a family dispute while the parties remain married. The ramifications of that type of action are not in any way conducive to a reconciliation. We recognize that intentional tortious conduct by one spouse against the other clearly shows marital disharmony and, in many instances of serious tortious conduct by one spouse against the other, dissolution proceeding follows. Besides issues of contingent fees that might have to be agreed upon between a spouse and a lawyer in such suits, we also find that a separate tort action in an interspousal dispute could be used as simply a legal tool to achieve a better settlement in the dissolution proceeding. It makes no sense to have different courts and separate proceedings determine interrelated issues between spouses.

Florida, interspousal immunity, law, case briefs, family law, Hill v. Hill, mental incompetency, Married Woman’s Property Act, dissolution proceeding, torts

NATURE OF THE CASE: This case involved the defense of interspousal immunity for an alleged assault and battery by a husband against his wife.

FACTS: Betty Burns (P) sued her husband Erit Burns (D) in circuit court for personal injuries resulting from an alleged assault and battery. In oral argument before this Court, counsel for the parties revealed that Mr. Burns and Mrs. Burns have separated and have filed for divorce in chancery court. The Circuit Court of Alcorn dismissed the complaint on a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings by D, holding that it was barred under the doctrine of interspousal immunity.

ISSUE: Is interspousal tort immunity still valid law in Mississippi?

RULE OF LAW: No. Interspousal tort immunity is no longer valid law in Mississippi.

HOLDING AND DECISION (Parther): Interspousal tort immunity is an ancient common law doctrine founded on the theory of the legal unity of husband and wife. At common law there was no right of action either by husband or wife against the other for a personal tort and there was absolute equality in that respect. There was no occasion to emancipate the wife with reference to such torts because husband and wife were treated equally.

The forty-four states that have rejected this doctrine recognize that reasons for the common law rule no longer exist as a matter of public policy. The three reasons traditionally assigned as justification for the doctrine of interspousal immunity are: (1) the legal unity of the husband and wife recognized at common law; (2) the promotion of peace and harmony in the home; and (3) the avoidance of fraudulent or collusive claims.

As a matter of public policy this rule no longer fits the reasoning and rationale of today’s mores as evidenced by the abrogation of the rule in whole or in part in 44 of the states.

DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.

DISSENT (Griffin): Here I know of no public clamor to allow one spouse to sue another in this type of action, and if it exists the legislature will take notice and debate it as a public issue. The legislature has had approximately sixty-four years to amend the statutes to permit such an action as this and to my knowledge no bill has even been introduced.