In the Interest of R.C. – Sperm Donor
In the Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989).
NATURE OF THE CASE: This lawsuit involved a dispute over the ability of a sperm donor to assert parental status.
FACTS: The sperm donor in this case (F), and the mother (M) were unmarried.
M discussed with F the possibility of conception through artificial insemination in 1985. F agreed to become a sperm donor under an alleged promise of parental fatherhood. M became pregnant and her son was born in 1986. In August, M told F that he had no parental rights as a father. She agreed to allow F to see the child only if he signed a release of his parental rights. F refused to sign and brought a paternity action alleging various incidents of the expectation of a paternal relationship. M filed for summary judgment, asserting that under state law semen donors had no parental rights. F countered claiming that the statute did not apply to him because he had an agreement to be part of the child’s life. F argued that under common law promissory estoppel, M should not be permitted to abrogate F’s parental rights. M’s motion for summary judgment was granted and this appeal resulted.
ISSUE: Does a known semen donor to an unmarried woman have parental rights with regard to a child subsequently born via artificial insemination?
RULE OF LAW: Unless there is a prior agreement to share in the parenting of the child, a known semen donor to an unmarried woman does not have parental rights in a child subsequently born from artificial insemination.
HOLDING AND DECISION: The court held that under these facts the statute in question is ambiguous with respect to the rights and duties of known donors and unmarried recipients. A number of commentators have indicated that the intent of the known donor and unmarried recipient is relevant to a determination of parental rights. A known donor’s consent and active participation in the artificial insemination procedure evinces an intent to assume the responsibilities of parenthood. However, an unmarried woman does not lose the protection of the statute merely because she knows the donor.
We cannot escape the fact of an alleged agreement between a known donor and an unmarried recipient that F would be the parental father of the child. From our statute we must conclude that our legislature neither considered nor intended to affect the rights of known donors who gave their semen to unmarried women under an agreement that the donor would be the father. As such summary judgment was improper as the court must resolve whether in fact such an agreement of fatherhood actually existed.
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
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