Kuhn v. Kuhn – Violence Against Women Act
Kuhn v. Kuhn, 1998 WL 673629 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a FRCP 12(b)(c) motion to dismiss by the defendant in a domestic violence case.
FACTS: One month after Ms. Kuhn (P) and Mr. Kuhn were married, D confessed to P that he had had sexual relations with another woman shortly before their wedding. P wanted a divorce and D restrained P and struck her as she attempted to leave their residence. The incident left P with a black eye and numerous bruises. Three months later P refused to have sex with D who subsequently became angry and forced her to have sex with him twice. D was physically violent toward P on several other occasions and broke her finger after taking a phone call from a process server.
P and D subsequently became involved in a contested divorce proceeding in the local circuit court of DuPage County, North Dakota. On the same day that a judgment of dissolution was entered P filed a six count complaint under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). The first count of P’s complaint was a claim under the VAWA and under the remaining counts P claimed state tort claims under supplemental jurisdiction. D moved to dismiss the complaint under the Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and filed a motion to request abstention on the VAWA cause of action.
ISSUE: What must a claim allege in order to withstand a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6)?
RULE OF LAW: In order to withstand a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) a claim must allege facts sufficiently setting forth the essential elements of the cause of action.
HOLDING AND DECISION: Congress passed the VAWA to establish a civil remedy in the form of a federal cause of action for victims of gender motivated violence. The VAWA does not cover random acts of violence unrelated to gender or acts that cannot be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence to be motivated by gender. To bring a cause of action under the VAWA, P must alleged that she was the victim of a crime of violence committed because of her gender, and that the crime was carried out on the alleged perpetrator’s animus based on the plaintiff’s gender.
In light of the evidence in this case D’s motion to dismiss must be denied. P has pleaded sufficient facts to establish that D’s alleged criminal sexual assault of her was motivated by P’s gender. The interplay between P’s gender and her status as wife will require a greater evidentiary exposition. We agree with the courts in Anisimov and Mattison that the crime of rape is motivated by gender.
P bases her VAWA count on three different crimes allegedly motivated by gender: unlawful restraint, aggravated battery, and criminal sexual assault. The VAWA defines a crime of violence as an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution or conviction.
DISPOSITION: D’s motions are denied.