LeClair v. LeClair – Child Support – College Education
LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H. 1993).
NATURE OF THE CASE: This family law case involved a dispute over an order for a parent to contribute to an adult son’s college education.
FACTS: H and W were divorced in 1978 when their son was 5 years old. The court did not make a child support award at the time. The boy lived with his father until he was sixteen and then he moved in with his mother. He began college in the fall of 1991 and W filed a petition requesting that H make a reasonable contribution to his college expenses. The master found that the total cost of school was $22,900 and that all but $8,056 was already covered by student loans, grants, work study, savings, and contributions from a paternal grandmother. H was then ordered to contribute $2,000 per year for a total of four years. H appealed the lower court’s award of post majority college expenses.
ISSUE: May a court order a parent to contribute to the college expenses of a child even though the child has reached majority?
RULE OF LAW: Yes. A court may order a parent to contribute to the college expenses of a child even though the child has reached majority.
HOLDING AND DECISION: H argues that the New Hampshire state legislature has abolished such awards. We disagree. The statute does not place a time limit on a parent’s obligation child to pay for reasonable educational expenses. The plain language allows for support to continue with payment for college.
As for constitutional challenges H raises primarily an economic issue. The classification between divorced and nondivorced parents in the statute involves no suspect classifications and does not involve an important and substantive right under our State Constitution. Thus the equal protection argument centers on whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. It is recognized that post secondary education is of increasing importance for the citizens of this state. The objective in allowing for support to continue is to ensure that children of divorced parents are not unjustly deprived of opportunities they would otherwise have had had their parents not divorced. The state has a dual legitimate interest in promoting higher education for its citizens and of extending protections to children of divorce to ensure that they are not deprived of opportunities they would have had but for the divorce. As such since the statutes only call for reasonable expenses they do not violate equal protection. H argues that the court erred when it forced him to pay for a private education when a public education was both available and reasonable under the circumstances. We refuse to make a presumption in favor of public higher education institutions.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.