In re Nikolas E. – AIDS – Compulsory Medical Treatment
In re Nikolas E., 720 A.2d 562, 1998 Me. 243 (Me. 1998).
NATURE OF THE CASE: This lawsuit involved an appeal from the denial of a child protection petition.
FACTS: The State sought custody of Nikolas, an HIV positive four year old boy, for the purpose of approving medical treatment for HIV. Nikolas lives with his mother who is also HIV positive. Nikolas’s mother and the father no longer live together and the father is also HIV positive. Nikolas’s sister had previously died from complications of AIDS. The doctor who cared for both Nikolas and his mother recommended that Nikolas undergo aggressive drug treatments. The mother expressed her distrust of the treatments and declined to permit her son to participate. Eventually this petition was filed to compel Nikolas to undergo treatment.
There was valid medical debate on whether aggressive therapy would benefit the child. The mother did not want the treatment but kept her mind open in case the child’s condition deteriorated. The court denied the petition request and this appeal resulted.
ISSUE: Must a threat of serious injury to a minor child be imminent before the state can take over custody to proscribe medical treatment?
RULE OF LAW: Yes. A threat of serious injury to a minor child must be imminent before the state can take over custody to proscribe medical treatment.
HOLDING AND DECISION: The trial court found that the mother’s wait and see attitude regarding Nicholas’s treatment was reasonable. There was no clear evidence that any of the contemplated treatments would be of any quantifiable benefit to the child. Nor was there any evidence that the mother was neglecting the child or that the best interests of the child were not considered by both the mother and the trial court.
The state bears the burden in this proceeding and there was no showing of imminent medical necessity or that the treatment would alleviate or cure or that there were no adverse effects of a substantial nature that would impinge upon the child. There is nothing to suggest from this record that the mother’s decision to delay the therapy was not rational or reasoned. The lower court was not persuaded that the mother was subjecting her son to a serious risk of harm in merely delaying the decision to accept a course of treatment of uncertain efficacy. Although there is expert testimony that Nikolas might benefit from this aggressive treatment, there is also competent evidence that the treatments might build up immunities later that might prevent a cure. We find that the decision of the trial court properly weighed the balances between the State, the child, and the parents.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.