People v. Liberta – Domestic Violence – Marital Exemption
People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. 1984).
NATURE OF THE CASE: This criminal law case involved an appeal from a conviction for rape and sodomy committed by the defendant against his wife.
FACTS: Mario Liberta (D) and Denise were married in 1978. Liberta began to beat his wife shortly after the birth of their son and she brought a proceeding to seek a domestic violence protection order in Family Court in Erie County. A temporary restraining order was issued to her by the Family Court and Liberta was to move out and remain away from Denise and the family home.
Denise agreed to allow Liberta to pick up their son and her and take them both back to his motel for a visit after being assured that a friend of his would be with them at all times. Liberta and his friend picked up Denise and the boy and the four of them drove to his motel. When they arrived the friend left and Liberta attacked Denise, threatened to kill her, and forced her to perform fellatio and engage in sexual intercourse with him. The son was in the room at the time and Liberta forced Denise to tell their son to watch. Denise went to a hospital to be treated for scratches on her neck and bruises on her head and back and notified the authorities.
Liberta was indicted for rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that he and Denise were married and therefore within the marital exemption to both rape and sodomy. The prosecutor opposed the motion, contending that the temporary order of protection required Mario and Denise to live apart and that they were therefore not married for purposes of the statutes.
The trial court held that the marital exemption applied and granted Liberta’s motion and dismissed the indictment. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment and remanded the case for trial. The Appellate Division ruled that a Family Court order of protection is within the scope of an order which by its terms or in its effect requires such living apart even though it is directed only at a husband, and thus found that Liberta and Denise were not married for purposes of the statute at the time of the incident.
On remand Liberta was convicted of rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree and the Appellate Division affirmed. This appeal resulted. Liberta contends that the statutes regarding rape and sodomy violate the equal protection clause because only men can be prosecuted under it.
ISSUE: Does a statutory marital exception for rape violate equal protection?
RULE OF LAW: Yes. A statutory marital exception for rape violates equal protection.
HOLDING AND DECISION: Under the statute a male is guilty of rape in the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with a female by forcible compulsion. Female, for purposes of the rape statute, is defined as any female person who is not married to the actor. A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree when he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion.
Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as sexual conduct between persons not married to each other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and penis, or the mouth and the vulva. Due to the not married language in the definitions of female and deviate sexual intercourse, there is a marital exemption for both forcible rape and forcible sodomy. The marital exemption itself, however, has certain exceptions. A husband and wife are considered to be not married if at the time of the sexual assault they are living apart pursuant to a valid and effective: (i) order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction which by its terms or in its effect requires such living apart, or (ii) decree or judgment of separation, or (iii) written agreement of separation.
Liberta was properly found to have been statutorily not married to Denise at the time of the rape. A married man ordinarily cannot be convicted of forcibly raping or sodomizing his wife. This is the so-called marital exemption for rape. The equal protection clause does not prohibit a State from making classifications, provided the statute does not arbitrarily burden a particular group of individuals. Where a statute draws a distinction based upon marital status, the classification must be reasonable and must be based upon some ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment.
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand.
As a matter of public policy, a married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman. Further, women are no longer regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being. Just as a husband cannot invoke a right of marital privacy to escape liability for beating his wife, he cannot justifiably rape his wife under the guise of a right to privacy. The final argument in defense of the marital exemption is that marital rape is not as serious an offense as other rape and is thus adequately dealt with by the possibility of prosecution under criminal statutes, such as assault statutes, which provide for less severe punishment. There is no evidence to support the argument that marital rape has less severe consequences than other rape. We hold that the marital exemption violates equal protection. We choose to nullify the marital exemption portion of the statute and as such the part under which Liberta was convicted is still valid.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.