Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform – Foster Care
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977).
NATURE OF THE CASE: This case involved a civil rights action brought by foster parents.
FACTS: Under New York law, children may be placed in foster care either by court order or, more commonly, by voluntary placement. Voluntary placement requires a written agreement signed by the natural parent or guardian transferring the care and custody of the child to an authorized child welfare agency. The agreement may provide for the return of the child at a specified date or upon the occurrence of a particular event. If the conditions for the return of the child are not included in the agreement the child must be returned by the agency in the absence of a court order within 20 days notice from the parent.
The agency commonly places children in foster homes. In such arrangements the agency expressly reserves the right to remove a child on request and a foster parent may cancel the agreement at will. Children may also enter foster care by court order. The issues in this case involve the determination of whether to remove the child from the foster home either because the agency has determined it would be better to transfer the child to another foster home, or to return the child to the natural parents in accordance with the statute or placement agreement. Most of the children removed are put in other foster homes.
The procedures involved in a challenge of foster to foster transfer are different from those in which a child is to be removed and placed in the custody of a natural parent.
A foster to foster removal provides 10 days written advance notice. If there is an objection a conference with social services is arranged. A decision must be made in writing within five days of the conference and an appeal may be sought for an adverse decision in a full adversary administrative law hearing subject to judicial review. The removal is not automatically stayed pending the hearing and judicial review. Family court has the authority to review the petition of a foster parent if the child has been in foster care for 18 months or longer. There is considerable evidence that many voluntary placements are coerced and that the system is biased against the poor. Children often stay in temporary foster care for over four years and many of the younger children develop deep emotional ties with their foster parents. Emotional ties however do not seem to be regarded as an obstacle for transfer from foster to foster.
In this case the district court found that these foster to foster transfers, in which the children had been with one family for over one year, inadequate and ordered a hearing to be held with all concerned parties before a foster to foster transfer could occur.
ISSUE: Do foster parents obtain a constitutionally protected liberty interest when foster children are in their care for over one year?
RULE OF LAW: No. Foster parents do not obtain a constitutionally protected liberty interest when foster children are in their care for over one year.
HOLDING AND DECISION (Brennan): Most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have stressed the importance of biological relationships. The foster relationship lacks this element. However, the marriage relationship is not based on blood but on emotional ties and for this reason, we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere collection of unrelated individuals. But as for family privacy, the State has basically created the relationship between the parties and has done so by contractual relationship. Family privacy rights are intrinsic human rights and whatever emotional ties may develop between foster parents and their ward, we cannot escape the reality that the State has been a partner from the outset. The statutes and the contracts executed argue against any but the most limited constitutional liberty in the foster family. Based on the competing liberty interests involved in the foster situation between the natural parents, the child and the foster family, we would be hard pressed to say that the interest acquired by the foster family would take precedence over one acquired by blood, state law sanction and basic human right. The foster interest must be substantially attenuated when the proposed removal is to the natural parents. Even though the foster family may have some liberty interest that interest is not violated by the current procedures used by the State of New York under any circumstances.
DISPOSITION: Reversed.
CONCURRING (STEWART): New York confers no right on foster families to remain intact, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of circumstances. There is no justifiable expectation on the part of foster families that their relationship will continue indefinitely. If the State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family over the objections of the parents without some showing of unfitness, and for the sole reason that to do so was in the best interests of the child, the result would be an impermissible intrusion into the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. This intrusion into the foster family is allowed due to the temporary nature of the foster family.