State v. J.Q. – Child Testimony in Child Abuse Cases
State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 617 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1993).
NATURE OF THE CASE: This criminal case involved a dispute over the use of expert opinion testimony to aid jurors in a child sexual abuse case.
FACTS: F and M had two daughters together aged eight and six. F and M were never married and F lived in a one room apartment with another woman with whom he became married in 1987. F would pick up the children for weekend visitation.
Approximately two years after the separation, M learned that one child attempted to pull down her sister’s underwear and touch her buttocks. When asked where she had learned of such conduct the child spelled out DAD. M disbelieved the information at first but then sent the children to counseling and reported the incident to the police. Both children reported that they had been the victims of repeated sexual abuse by their father. The trial court accepted testimony from a doctor who testified that both infant witnesses would suffer severe emotional distress if forced to testify before spectators, jurors, and particularly their father in a courtroom setting.
The trial court granted a motion to allow the children to testify on closed circuit television. The children described the sexual conduct in detail and evidence was presented showing that their hymens had been stretched. The same doctor then took the stand and testified about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) and that both children expressed symptoms of the syndrome. The doctor then stated that in her opinion the children were sexually abused. F’s defense was that the children were coached by M and that there was no opportunity for F to commit the acts at his one room apartment.
F was convicted and appealed and the Appellate Division reversed, holding that it was plain error for the trial court to allow the CSAAS testimony to establish the credibility of the witnesses and to explain secrecy, belated disclosure, and recantation by a child sexual abuse victim. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted cert.
ISSUE: May evidence of CSAAS be submitted to a jury as evidence of guilt?
RULE OF LAW: No. Evidence of CSAAS may not be submitted to a jury as evidence of guilt.
HOLDING AND DECISION: The court held that the evidence of CSAAS was not offered to explain the conflicting behavioral traits in this case either of accommodation or delayed disclosure. The evidence was presented to the jury to prove directly and substantially that sexual abuse had occurred. The doctor testified that the CSAAS pattern of behavior was found to occur consistently in children who are victims of incest and she outlined Dr. Summit’s five part syndrome; secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed disclosure, and retraction. The doctor then went on to describe symptoms displayed by one child (crying, shaking, rubbing her hand in her eyes, and covering her face) and that they were manifestations of her feeling of helplessness towards the abusive situation and her fears, anxieties and anger which she had to suppress to accommodate the abuse. The court found that the symptoms appeared to be generic post traumatic symptoms rather than the symptoms Dr. Summit had described.
The doctor testified to other symptoms of the children but when asked how one can determine whether a victim is telling the truth about sexual abuse, the doctor proffered her own theory unrelated to CSAAS. When asked if the children had been sexually abused the doctor gave her opinion that they were. At this point we are unclear how the doctor had reached that opinion; whether it was based on the credibility of the witnesses or on her understanding of CSAAS theory. If the latter, the evidence would not be admissible because CSAAS is not relied on in the scientific community to detect abuse. CSAAS can be used to explain traits found in children that have been abused but it cannot be used to establish that the defendant is guilty of abuse.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.